before we did the plan, the u.s. was a system of mexico with $36 million. here we are, this neighbor that's so important to us, we're assisting. at the same time, the united states will give 25 #% of all the foreign aid that we do, a lot of money. israel, egypt, pakistan, iraq, and afghanistan. nothing wrong with that, but we have to work with our frens to the south. we put in 1.4, and with additional money, it's $1.9 billion. for every one dollar we help with mexico, they spend $13. they spend a lot of money on security. they got to -- we got to understand what they are doing. now, what we started off, we did the easy thing, buy them hell cometters, buying this, and e worked with george bush, and filed the first legislation before bush talked about the plan because i felt that strongly about helping mexico,

but nevertheless, we worked together. we did the easy thing with mexico, the helicopters and the planes. the hard part is this is we got to start training or billing the capacity, the prison systems, the prosecutors, the policemen. we're working on it at the federal level, and they trained 36,000 police. i think they need 150,000 or more than that. we have to go into judges, train the judges, the prosecutors. did you know that a prosecutor here in the united states, if he or shements to get you, they have a 95% chance of to get you. did you know that in mexico, if a prosecutor wants to get you, they have a less than a 2% chance. if the police get you, maybe. a prosecutor, you'll be out there. the capacity is going to take a long time. we have to have a long term

commitment with mexico to ensure it happens. the difference besides them have been a balanced budget which we don't, and we need a balanced budget. >> thank you. >> and economic growth faster than us. the difference is that our institutions, the judges, the prosecutors, the law enforcement, we have a much better institution here. we have to help them build that, but it's going to take time. >> is that because they pay better? >> you know, and there is corruption on both sides. if you saw the general inspection, that came out, 13 # 89 cases that came up on homeland security. homeland security. is there corruption -- >> they convicted over 200 -- >> almost -- >> yeah, yeah. >> and they are still going. they are still going.

when i say, you know, it's at capacity, here in the united states, we have an institutions that are just stronger. i mean, they are civil institutions that are stronger. over there, when you have weak institutions, then the drug cartels can buy off people. not that it's not happening in the u.s., but -- >> until we drop the dirty profits, derailed and it's characterized as terrorist activity, bankrupting them, they'll have the resources to do it. mexico being a friend? what i did with the commissioner of agriculture is create an mou to have an exchange program. texas students, live there, and those that come here, but with the violence occurring, we couldn't implement it. that's crippling agriculture in so many ways. we have to get a hold of it. >> numbers real quickly. >> real quickly. >> ucr, the uniform crime

numbers you're talking about, that's the numbers that the fbi uses to look at crimes so people report. there is a, the other, which i think you're familiar with, the other one that has to do with -- includes home invasion, kidnapping, and the other things that people included. the fbi is slowly shifting over the area. the state of texas got a federal grant years ago to do that shift except when i got my fbi briefing, texas is only at 12%. we can start doing that, you know, categorizing more numbers to get this for the people, people want, but, but, we got to remember we don't want to overload our law enforcement, fill out paperworks like we did with teachers some time ago. we want them on the street rather than filling out paperwork, but the state of texas, actually, is doing some

of that. we just put money there in the state of texas, get all the figures that you want to. >> we spoke about this briefly, and i want to ask before i head to questions from the audience. two years from now, you may be campaigning for higher office -- >> [inaudible] >> when the website was launched, you had people praising you for doing it and criticizing it saying you were trying to, maybe, get a jump op maybe other people that might be running for higher office in 2014. what's your ambitions in 2014, and is the website directly tied in the border security issue tied to maybe what you might be saying on the campaign trail? >> this website is directly tieded to the president politicizing the issue and going to ucef making false claims. that's what it is. i served as state representative, state senator, elected as commissioner of agriculture. i was elected to solve problems, not to shun them. i have an exploratory 0 # 14,

nothing to do with what we're going to do to solve the problems. i've been an advocate for land owner rights. it's the greatest use for land owner rights i can imagine when you have cartels chasing people off their property. that's what it's about. >> folks, i want to open up to questions. line up at the microphone, and we'll go left to right. appreciate it. real quick. big round of applause. [applause] >> if you couldn't mention the word "general." >> my question is related to something that commissioner staple said. you mentioned people who buy illegal drugs buy bullets, and embedded there because the drugs are eel legal, that's a reason why there's the violence. clear hi, there's demand, 30 billion in illegal drugs purchased.

why are we not at least considering or debating legalizing, regulating, and taxing marijuana, for example, which is less harmful than alcohol or tobacco which we do the same for. thank you. >> thank you for that question. to assume legalizing marijuana would not continue the heinous activities associated with cocaine and heroin and methamphetamines is not recognizing the cartels for the violence criminal organizations that they are. in fact, we have studies that show because drug sales declined, they expanded into kidnapping to increase their revenue. they exes up and -- expanded into copyright violaters, moving copyrighted material between the countries. these are bad people who want to inflict harm on anyone in their way from making a profit, and that's simply not going to solve our problems, and it is not a

true reflection of the real crime when you haveño' people beheading and decapitating bodies and hanging them in the public square. >> legalize pot? >> i don't believe in that. soy, we can find other solutions. i don't think that's the right solution. ill that rehab, education, starting with the kids at a young age is important. you know, the last three years, put in $31 billion, and that process from the u.s. congress. that does include what the state does or local levels on non-profits too. it's fueled by whatever the numbers might be, $25 billion illegal drugs consumption in the u.s., and it's a big market. it's a big market. that's where nay are killing each other over there. the violent, horrific violation there. that's what we see. it's large consumption on that. legalizing drugs, i don't believe that.

do i believe in give ups? -- do i believe in guns? yes. [laughter] >> i come as a texan raised in dell rio and eagle pass, son of a border patrolmen with two brothers-in-law in the border patrol. i have a special sense of the issue we discuss here today. i'd like to focus on the distinction between symptoms and causes. the border is certainly porous and people from mexico without proper documentation, but here largely to find work, and they are finding work because we, in texas, are willing to hire them and pay them money. that is the -- that's the basic cause. the drug issue is that if it was not the fact that we were the

market, we are the folks that buy the stuff -- >> the question about the dismappedz -- demands -- >> the question is how from a policy standpoint, what would you do to address those fundamental issues? our consumption of the product and our willingness to hire the people who come here and walk to work? >> congressman? >> yeah, first of all, thank you. coming from border patrol, law enforcement, i really, really want to thank you and your family for doing that, and living at the border, i think you understand the situation. as said a few minutes ago, yes, we can staff more folks like we've done. border patrol has doubled the amount we've had, but it's not just the staffing and the technology and equipment, but it's also the policies dealing also with immigration. i've said that there's a full immigration reform bill, then we can let the people coming into work, that come in, where it's ag, whatever the other area might be. we have to do that.

then we can focus resources on bad people, trying to come in to hurt us in one way or the other with drugs, smuggling, trafficking, whatever the case might be. we have to look at that approach. >> unless you hire people without proper documentation, what do you think? >> thank you for your service to the country and preacing the country. on the issue of illegal purchase, i wish hollywood wouldn't glamourize it the way they do. on the failed immigration system, it is a contributor. i've been overhead, overnight, texas dps community kateing with border patrol on the ground, and they don't know if it's an ak-47 or somebody looking for one, and our country has relied on guest labor for 60-plus years, and we have to solve the problem, and you are seeing more proposals. the a.q. commissioner --

ag commissioners and secretary commissioners across the country have. it's politicize d by wanting to offer citizenship. we tried in 1986, and it failed. there's a mechanism of becoming a citizen of the country called the naturalization process. use that. separate that from establishing the work force needs, and i believe we can come together to get something done. >> let me just say this to add on. on the immigration, we want to make sure, and i'm not going to put you on the spot, but people who talk about doing immigration, and, by the way, the 1986 law was president reagan, democratic congress. i don't believe in amnesty also myself. i don't. there's a way to take out the 11 million, undocumented aliens, bring them out, and we can talk, but keep in mind that i've always said that we can talk about immigration reform, and we can have different -- i saw your report. you know, your stance, it's

different, but we can work it out. we really can. we can work it out. i would say talk about it. i'll raise my hand. i support full immigration we form, maybe not the way it was done in 1986, but we can sit down and work it out, but it's god to -- got to be done. >> sir, your question. >> yo have the law of unintended consequences. since the last immigration bill in 1986, you had the border becoming more secure year after year, and it's got to the point where the last few years, the cartels have not been able to ship all of their drugs. shipping half of them or getting away with shipping half of them so now they've been forced to get people in northern mexico to sell the surplus to them. as time goes on, they're going

to keep getting more and more mexicans addicted, and i'm curious, how long that process is going to continue until mexico says, you know, we're not interestedded in working with you on -- interested in working with you on the war on drugs. >> that sounds like he's asking to speak about mexican officials. i don't know if you want to or not. >> we can't -- >> is there a point -- >> well, and that's the very interesting point. 80% of the cocaine coming into mexico or the united states comes through mexico. i got back with my friend from the jungles of colombia to see a cocaine lab. two things i learned. what they put in is amazing, gasoline, as sigh, all of this bad stuff. you would be amazed what they put in. i learned it takes two years for that koa cape to go from columbia, say, central mexico and to hit the streets of a

city, an american city, takes two years. while they wait, it's not the miami vice where they drop it off. it's different. it takes two years for the cocaine to get here. therefore, they have to do something with it. that's right. the mexicans say we have a problem. we used to be a transit country. wii not a transit country anymore. they are getting addicted. you know, some of the problems that will only be americans for other countries, they are seeing that in mexico now. that's a good point and something, of course, only the mexicans can answer, and we want to work with them. >> commissioner, you want to add anything? >> the whole message we're talking about is that our country has to stand united expressing the will to win, but if we don't want to accept a new threshold for violence, and that we're going to accept the drugs run through the country. we don't want that for the country, and we have to stand united saying we will take the steps needed to get it done to

resolve it. >> representative? >> yes, i serve on the border and intergovernmental affair, and the red river, and they said, no, it's the other border. i went to iowa to help our governor in the presidential campaign, and i was amazed how many from iowa come as snow birds. they don't come anymore. we went across the border, bought stuff, ate dipper, went back a year and a half ago, and they said you can't go. i just want to -- no, you can't do that. there's a change. it's sad. we went to a restaurant a year before that, and the restaurant we went to used to be a restaurant across the border. they only have 15% of the business that we did. again, they have trouble with the border. my mother has friends there, a restaurant there that's now on our side. there is an issue, and whether it's as real as people think or per sighed as they think, the

one thing that the general did not report before this last one, the first one, he said we have to invest in our -- one of the major partners in this hemisphere with mexico. that's what you talked about. you talked about that. how do we invest with them? it takes the presidential leadership, and so i would just challenge both of you that the next four years, regardless who the president is, we all work together and hide the solution. it's been ignoredded. it's change in the last ten years. ten years ago, i could go across the border. now i can't. there's things that have changed dramatically. how do we get the next administration to focus which means more boots, which means everything else we've talked about, and making that invest ment with mention toe to coffle the problem over there. how do we go forward that way? i think it's going to take the president to do what the federal government's job is, which is protect the border. >> last question.

>> yeah, i wanted to bring up something other people have brought up, and that's, i guess, the root causes of the drug problem so my question is is what kind of pressure -- or do you guys talk about in the discussions you have, talk about the fact that they are the major consumers of the drugs that are illegally transported here, and then the issues come down to, you know, education, parenting, you know, communities, stuff like that. there's a lot of different things that play into the problems so what kind of pressure do you guys put on other organizations, you know, not just law enforcement and border patrol and stuff like that, but organizations outside of that that deal with children who you -- who use drugs and things like that. >> the question, sounds like community efforts make a bigger difference and how much pressure can lawmakers put on them? >> they certainly do. we have a host of ills in society today from children who don't have the right instruction from the parents. this is one that's exacerbated dramatically here today that we

deal with. it is going to take leadership as representative phillips talked about. it's going to take leadership to recognize that article iv section iv of the united states constitution says that our federal government's responsibility is to defend our borders. the state of texas has percent almost half a billion dollars of texas taxpayer money in defending the border, and we have to have that commitment at all levels it is the priority for spending. it is tough. i don't like the $16 trillion deficit, and i know you don't either. when looking at other programs, we have to make certain border security issues are funded first. that's how we solve the problems. >> i think across the state of texas, i think, you know, non-profits and other organizations have done a great job, and certainly, i've taken the approach this should be a comprehensive approach, not only the border security, and, again,

you know, without saying it's only this -- because, look, quite honestly, let's be real. if the president is a republican, the democrats complain. keep in mind that the border patrol plan we have now is based on president bush, and president bush is a friend of mine. if you have a democrat president, the republicans complain. i mean, that's just the reality, and it's unfortunate. i -- try to be as bipartisan, todd does the same thing. we work together. we try to do this. solutions out there are not political. the republicans don't have the best ideas, but democrats don't have the best ideas, but together, guess what? we have good ideas together. this is what we need to do. not politicize the border, but come up with solutions, and certainly, you know, i'll take any ideas you have, but it's comprehensive. the representative, thank you very much. i understand exactly. i live on the other river, you know, the other -- you know, and i've seen, and you've lived

there for awhile, and i never saw you with a jacket and helmet when you reported for the morning times, not the war zone, but we understand, as realists, we understand things changed. i talked to my brother. i talked to different law enforcement, state, federal, local, we understand what's happening there. mexico has changed. it's bad. you can't go up there to the bar the way you used to. i was there in northern loredo a week ago or two weeks ago, the new american consulate had a little celebration. i got taken this, and protected vehicles. it was, i mean, those were not the days where you could go out there and have something out there. those have changed. this is what we're seeing. it's going to be a long term commitment with mexico. it is a friend that we got to work with. we understand what's happening here, but understand that is didn't start in the middle of the river, not just in mexico, but other countries. we got to work together as

democrats and republicans. it's not a luxury, but necessity that we all work together for our own safety. folks, thank you, all, very much. [applause] >> we can certainly start making certain that bar charts like that showing the buildup in the sister states, that we get the help and support that we need for the lone star state. >> the next governor or candidate. [applause]

2013 should be the year we begin to solve our debt think tax reform and entitlement reform. i propose we avert the fiscal cliff together in a mapper that ensures 2013 is finally the year that our government comes to grips with a major problems that are facing us. >> i'm open to compromise. i'm open to new ideas. i'm committed to solving our@ fiscal challenges, but i refuse to accept any approach that is not balanced. i'm not going to ask students and seep yours and middle class families to pay down the entire deficit while people, like me, making over $250,000 are not asked to pay a dime more in taxes. >> the newly elected congress started work in january, but the current congress has work to do through the end of the year in what's referred to as the lame duck session. work is expected on the fiscal

cliff and the expiration of the tax cuts, the federal deficit, raising the debt ceiling, and by how much, and plan cuts to defense spending. follow floor debates starting tuesday at 2 p.m. eastern with live house coverage on c-span and senate on c-span2. >> now a look at the relationship between the united states and pakistan. we'll hear from a former u.s. ambassador to pakistan, the afghanistan ambassador to the united states, and a former adviser to hillary clinton. hosted by the world affairs council of america, this is 45 minutes. [applause] >> all right. it's a great pleasure to be here with such a great panel, three ambassadors and one globally renowned journalist and scholars so i've been told that there's been a lot of questions about

pakistan, afghanistan so far already in the proceedings, and i think we have first great panel to deal with those. what i'm going to do in terms of focusing the discussion is i'm going to tee off with questions to each of the panelists. one each, and then i'll allow for a little of follow-up, and i'll open the floor to you so you have time to engage with them. let me begin with, ambassador, who, you already got the bio, but is, i think, in some ways, almost uniquely positioned to provide us a very recent perspective on what pakistan looks like to the united states, to official american advisers and diplomats, and also lived the u.s.-pakistan relationship in what was an exceedingly drift and trying time, which is no reflection op him, but a

reflection on something much broader than that. the question that i have for you, ambassador, is how should americans understand pakistan? siewfn pakistan is at the -- so often pakistan is at the top of the list of nearly failed states, a country where we have a litany of problems, nuclear weapons and so on, internal dynamics often look very troweling, certainly from the outside. what direction is pakistan moving from your observation? is it, in fact, failing or failed? how worried should we be about that as you look at it from your perspective having spent some time there on the ground? >> well, thanks for the opportunity to speak about this, and i'll try to be brief with a couple points. one of the problems is not just the objective reality, you know, what are the problems with the pack -- pakistani economy, what are the faults of the economy, which is a democracy, even if it's

distorted, what are the problems with the neighbors. the main problem i see in the relationship is that we have rather pernicious stereotypes about one another. there's an american narrative and pakistani narrative in the way of our understanding. the american narrative understanding is these are a bunch of thieves and double crossers who take our money and don't do what we want them to do. this is a widespread prejudice against pakistan, and there's enough truth to it in the sense you can always find evidence of this, that it guides a kind of negative downward spiral and makes it hard to develop trust. pakistanis have a narrative that they use us and discard us. use us against the russians in the 1980s, toss us because because of nuclear proliferation in 1990. they use us in the war after 9/11, but after 20 # 14, they are going to go away. you can count on it. pakistanis think americans are hard wired to desert them. this set of stereotypes is

intellectually lazy and pernicious. a way to get out of this is haqqani, my counterpart, was the ambassador here, suggest the, time for a divorce, and others who said it's time for containment, push it away. those two are not reasonable alternatives. remaining engaged # with pakistan, there's no alternative to it, but i would argue that having a focus simply on a bilateral relationship is something that's a problem for us. we have to break out of this bilateralism, if you will, the sterile debate, and look at the issues that have to do with pakistan's relationship to india, the sequence of events that take place after 2014 when the americans focus, again, as steve mentioned, when the american focus becomes somewhat less on the relationship through counterterrorism and opens the door for more creative ways of

business, academic, media, other links with pakistan that really suffered in the last ten years because of the focus on ct. i guess i come out to the question answering that i'm cautiously optimistic if we keep it on the rails, which if you know what happened over two years, it's not an easy thing, but like rolling down the side of a are vein, and you don't know how far the ravine goes. when i say "keeping things on track," it's not easy to keep things on track in pakistan because of the way it's mismanaged, because of the difficulties in the relationship, but if we are able to do so, i think after 2014, there will be a prospect to open up to new kinds of cooperation if we are not slaves to a bilateral vision that's based on this trust, but if we focus on the multilateral and regional issues leading to economic growth, relations with india, and new relations with afghanistan. >> thanks. you've given us an important

vision with the u.s.-pakistan relationship, and the need to continue to remain engaged, but i want to pull you back so we have a chance to the specific issue of where pakistan, itself, is heading. there is the broader question of the bilateral, but how is -- what was your sense of the country? what is the direction that it is headed? >> well, i'm a refugee from academics. those who can do, teach, and those who can't teach become diplomats. [laughter] i'll give you an assignment. the british academic wrote a book called "pakistan: a hard country," came out in 2010 i believe, describing a society that's static, stable, but not capable of reform. in answer to the question, i think that pakistan has an enormous difficulty trying to make the progressive ri forms that friends of pakistan want to see because of triball, ethnic, historical regions. it's difficult for change to be.

you have parties in the country which are the traditional power brokers, and the system is very stable, but very difficult to move. ..

>> we are all heralded with the achievements that the u.s. has made with counterterrorism. two questions. one would be how have we accomplished as much in counterterrorism, and in particular, in afghanistan, as it appears, as widely reported and claimed by the obama administration. are things as good as they look?

secondly, getting us into the more specific question of jones. because this has been a controversial school that has in many ways gotten us. and we have written extensively about it. how would you take a stand on the drones on. >> thank you, john for those questions, and thank you for the opportunity to address this panel. what have we accomplished? the number one thing we accomplished is the death of osama bin laden himself. bin laden had al qaeda and al qaeda has a deep set of problems. he was telling other affiliates of al qaeda not to use that name of al qaeda. they were keenly aware of the drone program and he was

advocating that they move to eastern afghanistan. very different from american surveillance. and he was advocating that his youngest son moved one of the richest countries in the world. he was aware they were running out of money. he was dealing with some very improbable ideas about attacking president obama and general petraeus. and i think what have we accomplished? i think we have accomplished a great deal. ambassador cameron munter was very aware of what went on with the cia.

if you look at the drone strikes over the past four years, 2010 over 122 joined strikes. the numbers have been dropping since then is the highest number we have had. president obama has authorized six times more joined strikes than george w. bush did in his two terms in office. the numbers reflect 25% from that point in 2012. i think this is a very good thing. maybe because we have a tactic doesn't mean we should employ all the time. the army chief of staff, general gianni. you know, i think that is a good point. if you look at the victims of these strikes and how many civilians that we think -- the

civilian casualty rate is in the low digits. pakistan, you know, we enjoy a good political rating down from about 20% and the drones are part of that story. that is a pretty high cost. i think because of the work that people that cameron munter have done, saying that we need to be more discriminatory. we don't need all of these lights. it does not really serve our interests. the cost is really alienating the pakistani population. one final point. sometimes this is done in pakistani's interest and that is something that we need to communicate better. this is a guy who had the blood

of thousands of pakistanis on his hands. the fact that he was killed by a cia drone, it is one of the world's worst kept secrets. a drone attack as a public event. the fact that we have been having a more public discussion about this -- this is something that does offer an operation in pakistan the amount given all the work you have done in al qaeda. you are thing we have unique reporting in regard to the modern, what would you say that pakistan did or knew about the modern during the years that he lived? what do you make of that circumstance? what should we draw from it? [laughter]

use is subject to, you know, he was on the fbi's most wanted list. i mean there is no evidence that suggest that. we have 6000 that have been, we would've pointed it out publicly. >> leeann harmony on this one. >> there is no evidence that i have seen.

this is a different question than what we are talking about. to my knowledge, there is no evidence that they were there during that time. i mean, al qaeda was at war with the pakistani state and you know, we have had help on the issue of al qaeda. >> if you are interested in drones, they really have made an extensive effort keep track of the drone strikes to make it all publicly available. others are using it to compile pretty impressive maps and other things. if you are interested in this, i commend you. ambassador kelly, we have already touched briefly.

in india, india is almost always cited as a driver for much of what pakistan does. recently we have seen that the india pakistan with collations have gone a little bit better. we will revert back to the historic form or something more than that. >> thank you. it's a great way to be part of this. it is great to be part of this group. i would like to make a couple of comments. as steve said, pakistan is important because of the size. and also because of the

location. i am not sure i would agree with ambassador cameron munter. i think we are going through a heart wrenching process and it is an important time to see which way that process moves. on the one hand, it is a country where i still believe that the majority of people want this. it is a developed country where people have a sense of justice. it is not that different. but i also think that there are pressures which wants to put it in a direction of extremism. for all of those things, justice, development, and a number of those things. it is actually a moment of great

tension within pakistan. it is a moment that drags out. given that -- there are some things in that picture that we can talk about. i would like to talk about the new administration coming in. what is it we can do? spend resources and, you know, looking at this issue of what to do.

to the logic, the first thing is i think that this resignation has not worked. because as many people will say, pakistan is in many ways more critical. it makes life more difficult in the lives of the pakistanis. in some ways it was a designation to make sure that we didn't equate india went pakistan. look at pakistan in this way is not going to make it. look at it in more of a regional

picture. it remains very critical in pakistan. we are trying to [inaudible] is very difficult to make the point that pakistanis say on the side. it makes the day harder. just that no one should assume [inaudible] in practical terms, it seems to be knowledgeable.

it will be a very important thing. on the regional fun, because of what the competition requires, we need to have a productive relationship. the good thing, i think, is the people's awareness has gotten much better. military to military, the people to people images are changing. i think it is going to be harder for politicians to make the argument that people should go to india, especially since most people are a little fatigued

with this in pakistan in terms of resources. the military doesn't want to become a burning issue. that is a very productive thing. i do think it is important for saudi arabia to stop playing this game now of looking the other way when the we began to interfere [inaudible] therefore you need to develop

[inaudible] it is now sort of shifted over to an era -- even benignly. but it's never been that benign in pakistan. it is tolerated. this is not the body of islam. the fact that the saudi's have the title of people of the holy, you know, places -- it does not give them an open-ended thing to mess with things. i mean, it makes no sense in

terms of saudi interests. i do think this has to be part of the u.s. conversation as well as the pakistani conversation. the u.s. needs to start holding saudi arabia to some sort of transparency. because it is that sort of a constant, you know, raising the ante no matter how much we put into education or all the other good things that others do. i hope that this can be part of the focus of the u.s. administration. because for the security and stability and development of pakistan, the final thing i would say is that in terms of long-term return for u.s. money,

how much is delivered is going to be the benefit. i would put it into girl's education. i think the return is going to be far more than that aircraft carrier or anything else. thank you. >> thank you. thanks for not only addressing some of the internal issues, but taking us on our good to her of the region, which included india, and also afghanistan. obviously, pakistan's role in afghanistan has been spoken of in the historical context at great length. we now face a very interesting moment in terms that lead up to

2014 making sense of the political means to somehow bring this war is not to a queen anne, by drawing back some of the insurgents into a dialogue. pakistan's role in not to be especially concerning. i'm curious what you make of that. because we have certainly seen the overtures that the pakistani government is making to a wide range of afghans now which can be somewhat different from the past. and you have been intimately familiar with pakistan's behavior in the years that came before. what should we expect from the pakistanis with respect to our efforts in afghanistan over the next year or 18 months? >> thank you very much.

the world of pakistan and the key important transitions, the first transition is the political transition in the world of pakistan has played in this transition in bringing in certain elements of the taliban and the government. i will talk about the two transitions in afghanistan and the role that it is playing. on the issue of the political transition which is stability in afghanistan, they have no key position.

we will try to reach out to us. most of us will try to make connections where we could not act. finally, after many other contacts, they played a constructive role. the how connie's are fighting the hardest. they are probably accused of attacking the embassy and the embassy in kabul and others. it was not an easy decision for us and also for our friends in washington to say yes, we will do it.

but they say fine, if you bring them to the table, okay. and then they ask us what we need to do in the u.s. to include them in the process. of course, there were some pushback on that front. the role that pakistan has created has not been constructive overall. the outcome is what the consolation means. we have not on the promises of this. so every time that we make some progress, it makes the other party nervous. so there has to be -- before we get to the other side, we have

to do the same thing as other sides. on the issue of economic transition and dependency into the economy, none of them have been implemented. [inaudible] we don't see much progress. in the issue of transition and security responsibility to the afghans, there is [inaudible]

and it makes limited use sustainable. just to end on a very short, and on what our distinguished panel had mentioned, i expect the issue of not having evidence on one modern being part of this. [inaudible]

even though we have this in afghanistan, the pakistanis could [inaudible] it was something unusual. i wasn't very much in favor of this at the beginning. until the ambassador back then that i was fine with this war whatever -- [inaudible] >> very dead. >> thank you. let me just say that we could probably have this panel going for another hour. i could raise each of the questions with each of our panelists and get interesting answers. what i like to do is open it up to questions from the floor so

that they can answer your questions and comments are in hello, my question is at the invitation of ambassador ryan crocker, i was privileged to lead a group of six in march. we met with president karzai and credential to potential presidential candidates. everyone wants know what will happen after president karzai. he has managed to, you know, keep the country, you know, under control for the last eight years. and get some legitimacy at all the different ethnic groups. is there anyone that would have that same legitimacy?

>> fortunately, there is interest in afghanistan right now to make sure the president karzai gets an honorable title and i think that will show also as he leaves the majority of the afghan people to give them a sense of assurance that there will be no revenge. at the same time we have to be mindful not to create a sense particularly in our parts of the world that they are the only ones that have the best interests of the country in their mind. and therefore they should be involved. it is a tough balancing act. but as far as who will come, i think that we have a civil society emerging in a significant number of people who

are planning on running and it is important for all of that to continue to keep the pressure on to keep the pressure transparent 2014 because it is very much key to the mission being accomplished. >> i want to simply complement the ambassador for raising important issue of the education of women and girls. but to take it even further we recently had a speaker from afghanistan and they know her and says that this whole concept needs to be expanded to include also the young man who has not had the opportunity to be educated, especially because of all the wars in afghanistan. so i would like to really ask you if the united states is

missing the big picture of the thing that will keep our troops out of afghanistan or deal better with pakistan to help to improve the educational system in both of these countries. i would like you to talk about that. are we doing enough, first of all, in afghanistan to create that educational structure that will keep young people in general from being targeted and leeward by extremists, and we feel that the united states really gets this. that is the key to conquering extremism. not just with guns but with books to i think that this is different. but, you know, it is about the resources. of course, the boys ought to be the bigger picture. it is not going to be the billion dollars every month or

whatever that is nothing to happen. one of the great points in this country for ending the war as let's do something here, and let's take your resources. given the practical amounts of money available, my sense is that to educate them, the fact is if you educate a girl and she has other -- you know, if you educate a girl, it ends up that you educate 19 people because of the family system and the way it works. i'm not saying that the men should be a bunch of uneducated young, but the fact is they will find resources. from the u.s. component, i think

there is something to be seen about this issue. it is important to us. and put pressure on local governments to them for them on the overall bypassing of the total system. if it doesn't have a terrific extremist element built into it, for you to reach out is something that would be a wonderful contribution.

>> some of the also not so pleasant elements of the way that pakistan works. it is very important. with the legislation in pakistan, it is to try to match the ongoing military commitment that we have with civilian commitment. for exactly the reasons we said. the money you are investing long-term in the development society means that it is more likely to the troops don't have to go back and they are going long term. we made the mistake of trying to be all things to all people and we have overloaded an honest amount of money that we have put in per year. we were not as focused as we should have been. what we learned is a conclusion that if you have had been working, you could save a lot of money. we have a few key areas, one would be education, which is a priority. we have spent an enormous amount of money on primary education. now, the largest, by far, a

program in great britain is one they are doing in pakistan. within pakistan, there has been a constitutional amendment, which is involved in responsibility for education below the college level to the provinces. while that is seen as a means of giving government back in touch with people at a local level, some provinces are really bad at affecting us. they simply don't have the capacity. we try to build capacity at the government level. we have very mixed results. yes, you are right, push education, but at the end of the day, it is visible from the people on the outside to do things when there isn't a vision from the inside that you can follow. until the institutions i was talking about come up with a

vision they spend a pitiful amount of money on pakistani schools. until they come up with a vision, it is hard for the good will of the international donor committee to help them. there is private help. there are a number of charitable constitutions and a huge sector there. and they might want to get out of the government business. i think one of the key elements of how our relationship could transform itself if we focus on things like education. >> question in the back? >> yes, alan livingston, houston world affairs council. you mentioned terrorist groups operating within pakistan like a hick on a group and al qaeda. has there been any effort to rein in groups like the lat, which were operating and had ties with india, operating

mainly outside of pakistan? >> yes, i think we are making a general observation. in 2002, elections were fixed to disadvantage the secular parties. they had 11% of the vote which allow them to control two out of four policies. in 2008, there was a free and fair election in pakistan. and they were annihilated at the polls as they have these provinces known one. that is an important point for us to keep in mind. there was a group that attacked in 2008 and they operated under a different name because it is

identified with [inaudible name], which is a popular mass movement. it is sort of a al qaeda group that provides social welfare services. i think that the fact of the matter is the pakistani government is not going to crack down on whether these changes take place a number of times. it is seen as a liberation group which has a legitimate reason in pakistan. will the pakistanis do anything about the haqqani a network? that's the bigger question. they have not done that much. that being said, they did launch a major military operation which devastated the taliban. so you are talking about a complex issue that isn't really amenable to a prepared answer.

i think it would be in pakistan's interests if the pakistanis, by their own hand, they say that 3000 soldiers have died, more of them have died than nato and the u.s. command in afghanistan. that is why making an observation about this is pretty complicated. pakistan is a very large country with very different views on what to do. but i think the last point that i will make is -- there is more to the latest developments, including a 14-year-old child in which there was an assassination attempt against her by the taliban. in the long-term, the outlook is pretty poor. >> as i expected and hoped the market faneuil has provided us more than enough food for

thought. obviously, this could go a couple more hours. and the issues, including very important issues about nuclear weapons and so on that we didn't even have a chance to really go over, hopefully some of the other discussions will get to these matters. i would like to say i hope you join me in thinking our panels were very great conversation. [applause] >> next, more from today's event by the world affairs council with a look at the relationship between iran and israel. former obama administrator dennis ross is interviewed by philip crowley.

this is about 40 minutes. [applause] >> thank you very much. dennis and i have done this a lot over the years and never before an audience. you know, when you are the president's foreign policy spokesman and you are hanging out and have the israeli prime minister and then the chairman trying to reach a middle east peace, you go, okay, what we tell the press? and you say, you can tell them whatever you want except for this and that. and what else is there? [laughter] but now we have dennis ross was out of government. and he is writing a new book. when you think about the next four years, clearly how the united states relationship evolves with iran, whether the nuclear issue can be resolved short of conflict will be among

those if not the most pivotal issue facing the president in his second term. in 2009 when you were at the state department as the special envoy forswore wrong, there was a strategy of both engagement and pressure. going back to 2009 there is the engagement that has continued at a certain level through the five plus one process, but then there has been focused over the last couple of years on pressure sanctions and the 40% drop in iranian currency shows that we now have the pressure of the last couple of years actually creating the opportunity for diplomacy here in the forthcoming weeks and months three i'm going to start by trying to talk about my mindset.

normally i say you can talk about complex but you can't get away with anything. [laughter] today i will try to reorient myself and see ourselves in a different setting. we would sit together and we would say, what can we say. now, in retrospect, in the essence of the strategy, as it has unfolded in many respects, as i think we have anticipated, there was never an assumption that when the president was talking about engagement, engagement was going to be a kind of deal that we would have meetings with the iranians and we would be singing kumbaya and everything would be transformed. but there was an assumption from the beginning that engagement was a two headed coin. one side was reflecting the reality that we have not had a systematic ability with the

iranians on basically anything. we had episodic encounters with them over the years. but nothing ever completely. the thought was when you have had for over 30 years others defining them and interpreting our respective views and perceptions to each other, we need to see we can actually have a conversation. a conversation that could allow you to talk to each other and explain your perspective views and why you saw threats and what behaviors were problematic and what they have to say to us and be prepared to outline them that they have rights and

responsibilities. you seem to want your rights when it comes to things, but you want your rights recognized in the region but you also want to not threaten your neighbors. one element of engagement is that. there is another side to engagement. that was the obama administration inherited from the bush administration that the united states was so reluctant to talk to the iranians that that was not iran's behavior. and we need to demonstrate that we are prepared to deal with that. if there is a problem, it is not because we are reluctant to talk to them. it is because of their behavior. engagement always has within it the ability to immobilize the

pressure, particularly for those who were responsible. first they were not willing to engage and the security council plus germany gave results. we put ourselves in a position where billing willing to engage allows us to focus on a dual track negotiation to work together. the only times they have adjusted their behavior has been when there had been under great pressure 20 years or however long it took, the prime minister

came and said we don't have the forces. we don't have the money, americans have tankers and they have shut down the civilian airliner and we could be getting into complications that we can afford. we have to end this war and the leader had said suddenly we decided to end the war and it is the equivalent of drinking poisoned. he didn't want to do it, but he did it. in 2003 after we defeated the iraqi army in three weeks, suddenly they decided they thought they were nuts and that they wanted to do in return for a paper proposal on the table, which would have actually indicated their readiness to and

things with hamas and that proposal wasn't really pursued. but the fact is it was not pursued. but these two examples are indications that with the right kind of pressures, the behavior will change. as you said, p.j. , there is no doubt that we have succeeded in putting on them sanctions. in 2010 we had to change the dynamic. we got to the point where we were able to work with the rest of the world. the estimates right now are every two months. think about what that means. it means whatever they have in the bank is valued at half as much. the manifestations of this on a society are not hard to come by.

we had demonstrations during the most recent ramadan. three weeks ago we had demonstrations again. it was the linchpin of the revolution in 1979. you had the supreme leader for the last two weeks making statements where he says that he describes the sanctions as being in his words, brutal. this is the same gentleman who said sanctions make us stronger. we become more sufficient and we are better off. and suddenly we are talking about the economic worker and for the last few weeks he has called upon the officials to stop fighting each other.

the head of the revolutionary guard has put aside the head of the central bank and causing a currency problem. one reason is because they have a former president that helped to advance these people in the economy and suddenly they are feeling it too. the internal bickering is a function of depression. my wife says to me the good news and the bad news. for some reason she always wants the good news first. but the bad news is that the nuclear program has not changed. now, i think what this really means is that we are heading towards a year that is going to

be decisive one way or the other. i believe the administration will pursue a new diplomatic initiative, one that is geared towards, and has been for a while, putting an endgame proposal on the table. but with restrictions that would prevent a nuclear warhead capability. if you go back between the president now and then, they actually begin to define the concept of prevention because he says we won't permit them to have that kind of capacity. if you look at where we are, by the end of 2013, given the program, and the pace of the program, we will not be in the position to know unless the program changes whether they can present this or not. the combination of the pressures they are under and the reality

and our objective of prevention makes a diplomatic way out. i think the pressure is being talked about. the ministry of intelligence, this week, actually put out an analysis, which is highly unusual, in which they talked about what happened with force is used against them. and then it said diplomacy could achieve the aims at a much lower price. this is something you'd never would have seen before. they are probably beginning to position themselves to justify

this kind of negotiation. whether that will be sufficient to reach an agreement, that remains to be seen. >> you have a number of things coming up. "the new york times" story right before the foreign-policy debate and there was in the iranians are going to wait until the election. we have israeli elections in january. how long will this take? >> i am actually glad you had asked these questions.

okay, if they create opportunity and a problem, because before the election, there is increasing turmoil within leadership, which tells me that there is probably a fairly short window before they get into that. some of them are wearing right now is anticipation on their side if they are going to have to do something soon before they get into their own election cycles. we have seen that they get consumed, you know? first of all, they define who can run. most of the people who are candidates get disqualified. but even in 2009, in the context

with these candidates, there ended up being this remarkable thing that went on. and it was very preoccupied to them. it would be very interesting to see who emerges as a candidate. the first point is simply to note that i think there is probably a window of a couple of months. probably through february. after that, given the election in june, it is all maneuvering. and i would no one within in passing. this guy became his worst nightmare. by the same token, he probably wants to do something in advance

of the election because if there is a new president is elected and he gets credit for it, but not president becomes popular enough becomes a threat. he looked historically, there has been tension between everyone on the supreme leaders. so you're talking about the leaders. that is why i say it creates a kind of instant window. there is another election on january 22. you know, what you saw. the prime minister of israel when he gave his speech at the u.n. and he had this graphic illustration of the problem, he created what was a new threshold for them. for the previous, i don't know, six to 12 months, israelis have been focusing on what they called immunity. the result of immunity.

what you mean by that was the death and the breath and the hardening of the nuclear program they face an existential threat and have the military option to deal with it. so they are saying under a point at which they own immunity is going to kick in, he was saying this is going to be the end of 2012. he has changed that and has said it has been pushed back eight to 10 months. when the prime minister was in new york, he focused not only on his own immunity, but the point at which iranians would cross the threshold where they would have the ability to build a nuclear weapon and you wouldn't be able to do anything about it. and he was suggesting that that would be when they had one at

20%. that is a limited definition. the issue for him was to define in a way, it also pushed off into the middle of 2013. they came up with different perspectives and here again, i say that because there is an interesting kind of convergence of the next three to four months. this allows you to clarify. >> i would like to ask one more question of doughnuts. if people like to start asking

questions, please move to the microphones in the front and back. taking out a military strike was not a credible option because it starts a conflict without understanding where it ends. the military remains an option, but it says where ron asked first to try to break out of sanctions, and if so, there is a much more strong and justifiable and greater regional support. how do you see the role of military force in this? beyond that, the president says that containment is not his policy.

if diplomacy fails, but carries tremendous opportunity, is it a viable option, containment? >> okay, i can deal with entering the spread there was a debate within the administration of where the president adopted the provision. the debate was between an objection of prevention or containment. those who argued for containment said is we can live with that and we can contain it. we can do it because we have done it with pakistan being nuclear and -- [talking over each other] before we go back to the kennedy administration, even talking to

the soviets about the possibility of cooperating in this regard because of the concern of what it meant that china actually has these capabilities. those arguments -- the argument against containment was because it won't work. the iranians believe they have the right to dominate the middle east. this is their self perception. we are this long, historical culture that looks down on the aeros -- down on the aeros.

.. they get it, three administrations say they can't have it, we then go to iran's neighbors, like, for example, the saud iring's s, and say it's okay. we said they couldn't have it, they got it, take our asorn. you don't need to get it. well, that's not a credible argument to them to say the

least, and, i mean, i have my own personal experience because in the spring of 2009, i was asked to go through the king of saudi arabia, and explain our iranian policy to them, and i spent about an hour going through the details of this, and being elegant, and in the hour of doing this, he said if they get it, we get it. [laughter] for the next 10 minutes, i explain the consequences of this because i'm duty bound, and he said if they get it, we get it. [laughter] so much for the persuasive capabilities. there's a reason. it's not only that i was just saying if they were to get it, everything we said before would be taken seriously by the regional players, but saudi

arabia, your most serious competitor is iran. politically in the region, religiously, psych -- psychologically, and now they have this over you, and they will not tolar rate. it doesn't matter what we say. once we get the saudis they get it. they don't have the nuclear infrastructure, they have something else. they have money. they will be able to get it from, let's say -- >> pakistan. >> pakistan. [laughter] oftentimes we do these things in echo form. [laughter] they will have it. once they have it, this was the second part of the argument. containment won't prevent that, and now you talk about a middle east that's nuclear armed, and it's not just the saudis, and the idea that the concept of the cold war, which i was a

practitioner of, are going to work here, you know, i used to work on the soviet union, was an arms control negotiator. you had a guaranteed balance the power because each side knew they couldn't disarm the other. we both had a capability. in the middle east, you won't have that. no one will believe they can afford to strike second. now it means that everybody in that region's going to be on a hair trigger. now, think about it. it's a region characterized by conflict. that's the norm, not the exception. they are all op a hair trigger making the prospect of nuclear war likely in the middle east which is a pretty horrendous prospect to contemplate. that's the reason the president made the decision for prevention, not containment. to pick up on the rest of the question, nobody looks at the use of force as being something you want to do, but the fact is, you know, do i believe we have

to wait until the iranians do something? i believe, look, this president gave an interview where he said, look, i don't bluff. many things about the president, he's not impulsive. he thinks things through. when the debate took place, he thought about it, thought it through, made a decision, and it's objective. one of the reasons i believe he will, at some point we'll see a serious effort to put an end game proposal on the table, that, in effect, says to the iranians, you say you want civil nuclear power, you can have it. you have it with restrictions. turn it down, and i think that exposeses them before the world, and that creates the justification use force, one of the reasons you'd see that so i am not in the same place he is. >> my question has toot with --

to do with the violence, and i wonder how that would create real problems in larger war like the assassinations, including the acation nation attempt on the ambassador here and the cyberattacks, and iran, and towards the u.s.. >> certain things i'll address and others i will not. let me answer the question the following way. first, the war between the israelis has gone on for some time. in the 1990s, the negotiator on the issue, and we were con tending with act the of terror, and we knew they were being

pushed by the iranians, iranians pushing particularly islamic jihad to do this, and they were, you know, constantly demanding them to carry out bombings in israel designed to undercut the negotiating process, and, you know, one of the things that the devil does and made it profoundly difficult was every time we seem to make progress, we face a bombing. this is what the iranians were doing, and, you know, we, at the time, i recall before the 1996 election in israel, we actually went to the germans, you know, to say, look, you know, you've got -- you have relations with the guys. you have to put prush on them -- put pressure on them, and, you know, at that time, we were actually trying to push for severe sanctions because of what the iranians were doing on the terror front, not the nuclear front, but the terror prompt. this has existed for some time. there's obviously a built in

risk when you carry out, when they, you know, they do things towards the israelis, and the israelis don't admit to some of what you describe the as the assassination, but the fact is, you know, one of the actions can be taken that crosses the threshold from one side or the other, and, yeah, you can't know for sure what happens as a result. the fact it's gone on for awhile, it suggests each side stays within certain bounds. the nuclear question is really something different. >> guest: thank -- >> thank you. with the acuteness -- i'm here from freedom house, but speaking only for myself -- [laughter] with the acuteness of the iran issue on the rise, i think one other central problem drowned out is the israeli-palestinian conflict, and the depressing aspects of the foreign policy

debate that happened was it got barely a mention. i wanted to ask if you thought this was an issue that would get any attention among u.s. policymakers in the next four years, and more broadly, whether you think there's any pros pegs for a two-state solution in the near future. thanks. >> let me just add to that. i mean, there was a strong attempt in the first year of the obama administration, you know, to try to unlock it and it was not successful, but i suppose another aspect of that is is a peace agreement between prime minister benjamin netanyahu and president hamas, given the lack of trust and tension in that relationship, can that happen between these two men, or does it have to wait until leadership succession on one or both? >> you know, this is a difficult problem.

[laughter] full employment. >> yeah. [laughter] yeah. you know, i spent the last 30 years of my life on this issue, and, you know, we've had moments where i thought there were -- we had tremendous potential to really achieve success and obviously other moments that have been quite dispairing. the one thing i'll say is let's take a step back and answer both pj asked and also what you asked as well. the context of peacemaking is not great, and it's not great in no small part because the arab awakening created a chilling effect on both sides. for one, you know, you look at the rise of political islam all around us, and see if he were to take a step towards israelis -- excuse me -- there's bound to be

a backlash against him. just an example of that, he gave an interview to channel 2 of israel a week ago in which he was asked a question about, you know, would he return to the home where he was born in israel, and he said, no, he would not go back, and that was taken to mean that in effect, he was giving up on the palestinians issue right of return. now, for israeli, the issue of right of return means no israel. if all palestinians can return, there's no israel, and for pal stippians, the right of return has been a kind of the guiding spirit of the national movement. it's what the plo was built on, and, obviously, it's an issue you have to resolve, and built into that was the assumption that, you know, they could have, could return to the own state, not israel, and there would be compensation. that's effectively what we offered in the year 2000.

when he said this, it produced an immediate backlash, and so then he gave another interview in arabic in which he said, well, he was speaking personally, no one could give up the right of return, and although he gave -- i have to say he gave an interesting answer, to be fair, no right of return, but basically referred to, look, this is in resolution 194, the u.n.'s general assembly resolution 194 and in arabic, he referred to how that refers to compensation, that, by the way, not to bore you, and unfortunately when you lived with the issue as long as i have, there's no issue that's too small, and there's, like, nothing that unfortunately i have not been consumed by. 194 actually never used the words "right of return," but it talks about those refugees who

could return to their homes if they are prepared to live in peace, but never uses the term "right of return." right of return was something rather different. i refer to this because the context of the arab awakening has a chilling effect, and we see that in the behavior. he's not been, you know, he's constantly come up with reasons why he couldn't be going in negotiations. now, his rationale would be that he doesn't believe he could do it, negotiations possible, and so he's wanted to focus op -- he wanted benjamin netanyahu to meet certain conditions, and if he met them, that proves negotiations could lead somewhere. benjamin netanyahu's view was incest on conditions with me and with none of my predecessors. i'm prepared to talk without any pre-conditions. this is what we felt victim to in the obama administration, and there is a kind of, you know, there's been a chilling effect on benjamin netanyahu as well is that you look around your

neighborhood, and if you do a deal with the other, he doesn't even corral gaza, number one, and how long is he going to be there and what are you going to be facing? should you be taking these risks? each side has a reason not to take risks, but in my mind, believe it or not, that's notthe most important limitation today. the most important limitation today is there's complete disbelief on the part of both publics. i use the word "disbelief" consciously. there's disblee belief on both parts. neither side believes they are committed to an outcome. they look at the stall tinnian, and they believe they are committed to a phased approach of doing away with israel, or if they say "two states requests, it's a binational state and palestinian state. they never surrender control, and if they really believe in two states, why are they

building in what should be our state? both of them have a story they tell themselves. i'm talking about public. the other side is not committed to a two-state outcome. now, that's not an environment in which you can say, gee, put a plan on the table and have it be sented. put a plan on the table, both sides reject it. if you put a plan on the table, the idea it's only table, it might be something that could work in a certain moment, but if they are rejected, it's hard then to somehow recreate it so i will pause now. i actually do have a 14-point proposal which will shock you. [laughter] i actually do. >> we are already -- >> i'm willing to leave it. >> you were patient. wuch last quick question and quick answer. >> thank you very much. i'm with the las vegas council. if the administration decides that military action is our only

exercisable option, have other allies signaled or committed they would support israel and the u.s.? if so, who, and what type of support can we expect? >> well, i don't think there's been those kinds of discussions because the focus has been on diplomacy on everybody's part. the concept of crippling sanctions is an israeli concept telling you the first instance the israelis believe you can achieve this in notary public--- non-military means. i'm asked the questions why are the israellys vocal about this? you look what they did and the syria war, in which was they had in 2006, you never heard word one about it before they did it. why are they vocal about this? there's three reasons why they have been so vocal. one, it was designed to motivate the rest of the world, and i think, by the way, if you, you know, we know from our emphasis

regarding the idea that the europeans would have adopted the sanctions they did like a boycott on iranian oil if they didn't they the alternative was they would strike voluntarily, and to think that would have happened without the israeli, quote, motivation," is not realistic. the second reason they do it is because they are getting the world ready not to be surprised. if diplomacy fails, and the third reason is to get the public ready. that reflecting their reality, but in answer to the question, we've, you know, you've -- we've not had conversations with others that i'm aware of that would deal with that, but i note for you that david cameron made statements saying, you know, also repeated the words "all options on the table," we want deploam sigh to work, but we want all options are on the table. we're not the only ones to say al options are on the table. diplomacy is the most desired

option. there are others who, if the context is created, and this the point about an end game proposal, the iranians have a dip mattic way out, and they chose not to take it. that creates a context. the last appointment because we are over time, it is important to have that context because understand one thing. in 2007, iranians crossed the threshold where, on their own, they have the know-how and capability to do it on their own. if you destroy all the facilities, they can rebuild them. what you want is if diplomacy fails, you have to use force, and force against the nuclear program, shouldn't be broader than that, you want to maintain the same severe sanctions because that will raise the cost then dramatically of trying to rebuild. the more you create this context, that is more likely to affect them in the first place so force, itself, is not necessary. >> join me in thanks a good

friend, dennis ross. [applause] and we'll convene the next panel, you know, very quickly. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning.

i'm bill clifford, president and ceo of world boston. as we head into the pam assessing the aftermath of the arab spring, allow me to thank todd, president and ceo of the world affairs councils of america, his crack staff, national council chair, laurie murray, and our many sponsors for this significantly stimulating conference thus far. [applause] like america, i am a wash in debt. it's time to make good on those obligations to each here on the panel who i'm honored to present. i had the pleasure of hearing at dozens of universities in the boston area. i'm owing you a way overdue invitation to the council downtown. professor is a senior fellow at the saban center at brookings

institution, a distinguished former and current adviser to government agencies, u.s. leaders, and diplomats, and he's a prolific and best-selling author. i'll quote from the top of the website at the university of maryland where he is the professor of peace and development. i have always believed that good scholarship can be relevant and consequential for public policy. it is possible to effect public policy without being an advocate, to be passionate about peace without losing analytical power, to be moved by what is just while conceding that no one has a monopoly on justice. i think our other scholars and our world affairs councils colleagues shares that sentiments. jinan reid, a associate

professor of global health at duke university, a carnegie scholar, and she's half libyan, spent much of thechild hood in libya, and thanks to the arab spring, she's had a touching and moving reunion with her father after many, many years. i owe you great thanks for a zesty presentation at world boston two months ago, and i won't go into it, but i also owe you dinner. [laughter] professor mark lynch is not here yet so i owe mark great gratitude for giving me the opportunity to live a lifelong dream and be clint eastwood. [laughter] p.j. crowely who needs no introduction because he moderated the last panel, i do want to say something. in march of 2011, weeks into the arab spring, the state

department sent p.j. to the home down, boston, where we had the great privilege of having events at university schools community cations, emerson college, and we had a fine lunch chon where he wowed our crowd. >> and mitt. >> and mit which world boston was not responsible for that itinerary. over the week, i'm driving in new england, listening to npr, p.j. crowely just resigned. well, p.j. thank you very much. my members loved you, but monday morning, i had so many calls and e-mails from members, what did i miss by not going to that lunch. [laughter] he's a man of great candor, principle, got in trouble for speaking truth to power and saying something about the treatment of private brad manning over the wikileaks thing. you landed on your feet. i owe you all great thanks for you being here today.

thank you. >> i'm glad i could do that for you, bill. [applause] i resigned two hours after speaking to world boston, tour not connected. i wanted to make that perfectly clear. [laughter] we're coming up on the two-year anniversary of this thing called the arab spring or arab awakening, or as mark uses in the title of theñi book, arab uprisings so almost two years from when a phyt vendor in tunisia lit himself on fire and literally changed the region. i want to go country by country, but first at the 40,000 foot level. what is this about and what happened over the last two weeks? >> so, my comments today will be from the academic side, but also a little from the personal side as bill mentioned, i'm half libyan, spent 15 years in tripoli, benghazi, and egypt. my perspective on what happened over the last few years is

somewhat in comparison to what was happening in the 70s and 880s when i was there and when the reagan administration bombed libya. now what we've seen is one of the most interesting things to me is that the u.s. had very little to do with what happened there, that the uprisings were very much from within, and they were very much about the economics, devastation that many of the countries were in, and this was very much a grass roots movement, and that, to me, was a signal of hope. this was something from the people themselves and not something that was imposed on them from outside, and now i think we are a little impatient. it's only been two years, and there are still a lot of problems, and each of the countries have their own specific unique problems we'll talk about, but i also think that it's just been two years, and in the case of libya, for example, this is after over four decades of stagnation under the

horrible rules, so expectations should be moderated based on the fact this is a process that's going to take time. >> well, let me just address this by, you know, kind of answering the question why were so many people surprised by the uprisings, and use that as a way of understanding what is actually going on. we were not actually surprised that the public were angered with government. in fact, all of us scholars studied this, public opinion apologies for ten years, and every year i say the gap between government is growing, and the only question is whether people have reason to revolt, but whether they have not already. we knew there was economic problems, frustrations, no transparency, corruption, there was the government stood for one thing, the public stood for another thing, and there were separate identities. the fact in egypt, the first thing they say, you know, raise

your head, you're an egyptian, meaning be proud after the revolution was an example that they were not proud of the government as representative of the people so the question, then, is what happened? this was true for a decade. there was nothing really particularly unique about 2010 or 2011 that you say here's a major economic crisis whether it's tunisia or egypt or anywhere else so extraordinary that it propelled people to do something they didn't do five years before. you can't blame it on the economics. the question is why didn't they do it before? the answer we have is the right answer which is, look, we had political scientists always assumed it's not enough to have angry people to revolt. you've got to organize. you got to get a lot of people to the streets. the government has to feel the heat. the fact there's app gri people doesn't -- angry people doesn't make it. government understood that you can't get people to the streets

without organizing. they preempted organizations, outlawed parties, kept tabs on social institutions. they chopped heads when they needed to. they put leaders in prison that challenged them, and they were under control. that's why you had people saying it's there for the long haul in the middle east. what happens over the past couple years is something we watched for a decade, but we did not understand is the information revolution actually enabled people to turn out in large numbers without need for significant or traditional political organizations or political parties or charismatic leadership so when you get a million people in the streets, really government control completely. the real issue then is not what why they revolted, but there's a set of reasons for it. that was not a surprise. they were able to do it and it

was so rapid we did not understand it. we studieded it, understood the impact of satellite television, but the expansion, particularly over six years, did the polling on how many people use interpret in the arab world, expansion is unbelievable. you see the consequences of that. now, that tells me, by the way, when people ask what is going on here in the middle east now, and we don't know how it's all going to turn out, but we know one thing. you have a public empowerment in the arab world. that is expanding, only expanding because of the information revolution. no one can stop it because it is tied to the economic prosperity issue. you kill it, you kill the economy. it's just moving forward. that adds a dimension of power to the public that is going to force itself on to the poll

ticks of every country and every government no matter the differences among them. >> certainly when you think about tunisia and egypt, two of the most connected societies in the middle east from a media standpoint, it's not surprising that started there, but what about yemen? one of the lesser connected societies in the middle east. >> well, -- >> do you want to -- >> no, go ahead. >> first of all, yes , -- yemen, surprisingly is well-connected. what surprised me out there for a conference, limited internet, and i was using still aol, you know, the dial-up aolu called using the regular telephone lines, and they had a local number for aol to dial up to. it's more connected than you think. you know, more, but, you know, i

say that because i think when you get, you know, there is something called an arab uprising or arab awakening or arab empowerment, not just country to country. yes, it started in tunisia, egypt, the satellite television clearly had the power of communicating because you didn't need a lot of people in some ways to use the interpret because when you have one person taking a picture, and then one perp's communicating or even tweeting, and then al jazeera puts it on. it's the mixture. it's the mixture of the social media and the satellite television according to my polls, you know, for the past decade, if you look at where we started, where al jazeera in the late 1990s had very little viewership in places like in north africa. by last year, half of the arab

public said al jazeera, specifically, was the first choice for news and another 20% to 030% said a second chance for news. that gives you a sense how the local, national media became marginalized over time, and that is will be the story of the -- and that has been the story of the whole decade. >> start going through with tunisia. good news story, so far, so good? >> yeah, i mean, tunisia had a unique history and cull -- culinzation, and what you see looks promising and even what you have seen in libya. >> we'll get to libya in a second. egypt, we have a new leader, i know, and you go through the definition of what is an islamist. there's good islamists, bad

islam is, but what is the president contending with in terms of constituencies? it's another thing to be responsible for governing and how do you see how he's done in the first few months after office, and what are the prospects to evolve or empower? >> i know there's a lot of people frustrated with e just a minute, people who expect -- egypt, people who expected quick transformation, and whether it's in egypt, and where the economy's difficult, and there's a lot of up certainty whether it's the outside world. for me, as a scholar, looking in the revolution of change that's undergoing, it's been a miracle that it's been relatively steady forward. it's been relatively stable. it's been relatively absent of major violence, and those things are promising. they are problems. we know that, you know, when it

started in tunisia and egypt and contracted that with baa rain or syria, and they say in places like syria or bahrain, you have a divided community, society, shias, and in syria and egypt and tunisia, you had relative home genety of the population. that's true. what we have faced, if you look at what happened in egypt, initially with the -- when they had the parliamentary election, people assumed it was principlely now the public supported mostly the islamist groups because they did. you know, they basically controlled most of the parliament between the muslim brotherhood and by the time we got to within a few months, by the time we get to the first round of the presidential election, what did we have? we had only 46% turn out for the

election by the way, remarkably, and the brotherhood was good at turning out people. they got just one quarter, one quarter of the votes, and then in the end, when you have the final round between morsi and those p cat dan of the establishment, you can call it, the two kind of cementer, it was so close, we didn't know the results immediately between them. egypt is a divided country. that's number one of the we have to know that. the brotherhood, maybe others assumed after the parliamentary election they have got launched, and they discovered they don't, and at the moment, they don't -- not only contending with that division, but they are contending with pressure from the right, particularly in the drafting of the constitution. this is really the biggest issue right now facing egypt is the writing of a new constitution. today, as we speak, in tahir square, thousands demonstrating called upon by one faction, not

uniting on this calling for more specific references in the constitution where there is a deal that's moderate between the party, muslim brotherhood and the liberals. it's a work in progress. it's going to be tough. the tewingal issue, to my mind is the most important issue they face, more than the economy because ultimately, that's going to tie their hands down the road to determine the relations they face. >> we'll give him a chance to catch his breath. libya, a study of contrast. it is when you do the polling, and a lot of it, the one country that's pro-american, unabashedly pro-american, and we saw in september an attack on our diplomatic outpost in benghazi.

put this contrast in per specttive for the group. >> absolutely. one thing that's important to know about libya is even though in terms of the size, land mass, it looks a lot like egypt, and in terms of actual population, it's a very small country, six to eight million, best guesses, and there's really pretty much in triply and ben gay city, and back to the information age, there's a lot of social media and the younger kids well-wected, -- well connected, there's still a huge lack of information among libyans themselves. my father was half mile away from the empowerment -- embassy when it happened. they had not a clue. they just heard gunfire and something was wrong. it was almost a half day later before they found out what was happening. there's still a lack of organized information, and there's also still a lot of mistrust of the leaders. there's a lot of factionalism

among the current leaders of the libyan government. i mean, this is, again, getting back to the 40 # years that you did not say gadhafi's name even in a positive way in case it was misconstued and the police would get you, and you had the hanging in the town square, took the body in the helicopter to dump into the sea. this is still an underlying fear about what the information is that they receive, and if they can trust it. >> and they are heavily arm. >> well, and this is the other problem. there are a lot of arms left over in the hands of the wrong people. when i speak to my family there, there are a bunch of thugs that have these weapon, and we want to be rid of them, and we want to move forward, and the other thing i hear a lot is they do not want sharia law or go the way of egypt so we'll see what

happens. it's true that they are very pro-western, very pro-american despite what we saw happen in september and despite the fact that, you know, in the mid-80s bombed, and that's in the fore front of their memories. >> mark, turn the lens around a bit. in the book "the arab uprising," you traced the challenge from the united states stand point in creating a credible narrative about what's happening in the region, and in creating, you know, consistent policies across the region. is it possible to have a broader coherence when, you know, for example, when you, the president says identify what the aspirations of the egyptian people, but then what about bahrain? we invoke a responsibility to

protect the libyan people; then what about the syria people? what's this mean in terms of u.s. interest in the short term and u.s. presence and interest in the region in the long term? >> that's a great question, and the short answer is that, no, there's no such thing as consistency. it's not the way foreign policy works, but -- [laughter] a slightly longer answer would be that -- so i think there's big changes that i think we've begun to recognize, and i think that the administration has been good in recognizing them, and i think it's going to be increasingly institutionalized. one of those, for a long time, there was a bipartisan consensus we'd rather work with friendly dictators than to deal with the messiness of the democracy. every administration in my living memory talked about democracy, but none of them wanted it. what they wanted was friends that would be slightly nicer, more stable, more legitment, but every time an administration was faced with a choice of whether

to, you know, push for real democracy to empower the public that could be hostile or difficult to deal with, they always chose the dictator over the people, and i think that that idea that we have that choice, i think that's simply gone now. it's gone differentially, different rates and different parts of the region. we have not caught up with the realities of the supplies of the gulf, but the idea that we can make that choice anymore is simply gone. i mean, you listen to the debates in the united states about should we have let egypt happen? you know, why did we do this to egypt? what we talked about before is this is ridiculous. there's millions of people in the streets at the end of january 2011. every police station in alexandria was burned down. tahir square occupied. we didn't make it happen. we couldn't have stopped it if we wanted to, and the

recognition of that fact, i think, is really important. number one, that old idea that we have -- that we can go back to simply working with friendly dictators, i think that's just gone. sec, which i think is really important, is the idea that we can control the region. that, in a sense, the region is crying out for our leadership, and that every problem in the region has to be solved by us. i think that there's a healthy recognition now beat into us by the war op terror, by iraq, and now by the ash uprisings that the ability of the united states to manage and control what happens in the region is quite limited, and so the combination of those two things, i think, then helps to explap a lot of the inconsistencies you see in a place like egypt or tunisia. there's a recognition of the realities of the popular movements and trying to do the best we can to shape those in a democratic direction that protects our interests.

we work with the military to make a real transition to democracy in e just a -- e just a -- egypt, and in a place like bahrain, we see the saudi opposition to evoke democratic change there, and we can't stop it, and backed away, one of the worse mistakes we made in the arab spring, but you understand why they did it. there was an easy opportunity to do a significant amount of good to stop an impending massacre and to broker real change without putting troops on the ground, you know, it was a country that was perfectly designed for air power intervention, the geographic precision, there on the ocean, seeing those things. syria is a horrible problem, but it's too difficult for the united states to easy solve, and so we recognize the limits of our ability to act. broadly speaking, that's how i

answer the very big question. >> can i follow-up quickly? >> absolutely. >> just picking up on what you said about the ideas of the united states trying or needs to control the region, and this picks up a little bit on yesterday's discussion about the role of the united states as a world leader, and, to me, one of the ironies is the united states wasn't sort of the force up front, you know. it was england and france in the case of libya, and, you know, if you think back to the 80s, the irony, and the french not able to fly over the air space with the bombings on tripoli and the french embassy in tripoli was bombed and there was a riff between the united states and france. i mean, you know, close to 20 years now, but i recall it. i was there. you know, fast forward, and, really, the united states was not the driver in the libyan case or in the egyptian case. >> well, if i may, on this one, too, i mean, i think that the

administration did one thing right and understand that from the beginning which they understand that this is not about america, and it shouldn't be made about america. i think that was the assumption that really drove the administration, and america counts -- couldn't change the course of history. those were good propositions, but beyond that, there was a set of problems, and libya was an easy one for two really republicans beyond just the location and the consequences because it's relatively limited. syria has consequences for almost all the neighbors. one is that for the first time in history, you had almost all the arab rulers and the public at a time agreeing, you know, that this guy, gadhafi, should go, and support intervention. you had an international security council resolution enabling it. those two are huge. you know, in a a time, particularly, looking for legitimacy, i mean the two are not comparable or separate from

the situation, but the one thing we have to be careful about, though, is to leap into the cop collusion that we just embraced democratic change and it's irreversible. let me tell you why, and it's not yet there, and i think this administration's going to try. it obviously can't always succeed, but i think at the core, there's also an american public opinion. what happened in our public opinion, right after, particularly after the revolution in egypt, tahrir square created the paradigm different from the 9/11 paradigm, and we polled on this. i've done public opinion polls here in the u.s.. when you ask the american public is the arab world driven by ordinary people seeking freedom, democracy, and dignity or driven by islamic groups to take control. more people said it was the

former, that this was ordinary people like them essentially. in fact, you saw it also then when you asked them are your views of arab favorable or unfavorable? majority of the americans in april 2011 had favorable views of the arab people, the muslim people. 70% expressed favorable views, and egyptians, that has changed over the past year. what we see in the most recent polls i conducted last month is really a change where you have more people saying the arab uprising are about islamic groups taking control, not ordinary people, use of the arabs that are now sort of 50/50 favorable, unfavorable, and like on all the other issues, there's such a huge divide in america. it's, like, it's two countries in one. you have two-thirds, you know, of republicans say that clash between us and the arab world is

still at the core a clash of civilization that can want be overcome, and the majority of democrats and independents, on the other hand, saying, no, it's about conflict of interest that could be overcome. still, though, it's like the majority of americans, remarkably, supports democratic change, even if it leads to governments that are not friendly to the u.s.. there is a big divide, again, among, between republicans and democrats. that divide in american politics, and that transformation of public opinion that is a function of what's happening in the middle east leads me to believe that you can certainly have politicians who can exploit it in different directions. >> can i build on that? i have not seen the latest polling, but piewg did a sur vie in april of 2011 and another one in october, and they found a 30-point drop in americans saying that the changes in the middle east will lead to lasting improvement of people's lives, and, you know, what they found for the number of people who thought the percentage of

americans who thought the changes in the middle east were good for the united states? 14%. >> can i say, also, this is getting to the heart of a very important issue which is the way in which americans define democracies will never look like that in the arab world. part of what we are seeing is also this realization that the disconnect between, oh, that the governments are in place, and we're expecting x, y, and z to follow as it would in a western democratic state is never going to happen. the expectations of what the democracies should look like moving forward need to change. >> but my point, fundamentally on this is that the really big change, cog kniferty change to happen for americans is to understand that arabs are not waiting for and more than permission slip. [laughter] they're just not. they don't care if president obama stands up and says, please, want democracy. we're not leading it. we shouldn't be leading it.

we can do things to help leaders stop it if we want to. we can sell arms to the bahrain government and protect them from international sanctions. that's a bad idea. we can do it, but it just delays the inevitable. i don't think bahrain has lasting stability by doing so. now jordan and kuwait have the most serious political crisis of the modern history other than being invaded. >> since 1990. >> since being invaded. jordan is not doing better. i think we'll have very serious charges soon where we have to decide where we stand on that. >> we'll take questions momentarily, but one more about syria, and you said there was -- there's not the regional consensus to act yet in the context of syria as there was in

libya, what's the education of the grind that we see tragically every day? there's indications of spillover, and, obviously, jordan's dealing with significant, you know, refugee populations like turkey. turkey's exchanged fire with syria now and again. hands in the cookie jar from the saudis, iranians, and the others. what, you know, how -- one of the implications along with this goes what do you see as the likely scenario for syria in the next year or so and what can the united states do? what could the united states do? >> so one of the things you talked about are what are the perceptions of the americans in the region going to be given we have not been as aggressive or aggressive at all as we were in libya, and some of the things i heard come out of the region is there's a belief that we were aggressive in libya because of

the oil, and because it was in the west's best interest to help whereas syria doesn't have the same sort of draw, if you will, so in moving forward, at least, we have to consider the fact that part of this is seen at least amongst some factions in the region as representing our best interests, and if our best interests are not served, we're not going to act. >> well, i think on this one, i'm not sure i really agree, and in the sense that i think that let's say we act tomorrow. i guarantee you the press will say we have some republicans for agenting, even if it was totally humanitarian. there's just not trust with american intentions when it comes to military agenting, and, of course, we're constrain in the way we act anyway, and our cooperation with israel will be different. i just don't see it. i think that it's a huge dilemma for the administration, and when i watch, you know, we all believe when you watch all the

casualties, and you talk about the strategic consequence, look at the humanitarian cost for the serians. it's been a painful thing to watch with a failed international system. let's face it, it's not just about american foreign policy, but a failed international system. you talked about the information revolution in the arab world, there's a global information revolution. people watch this. they have expectations. when assad, the father did this in 19 82, people were not watching. it was not on tv. there was no expectation. know we know about it as it goes. the public wants to see something done whether it's in the middle east or elsewhere, went we have no way of dealing with it. it's a failure of the system in terms of that, but, still, when you look even in the arab world, 90% of the people i polledded in six countries sympathize with the rebels against the syria government. when you ask them, do you want to see western intervention in

syria, ma majorities say know. they still -- they want something dope. they don't know exactly what it is, but they couldn't want to see military intervention. this is a big one for the administration, not only because you don't know what the morning after will be. you see the divided opposition. yesterday, as you know, the secretary tried to help forge a different coalition in qatar. it didn't quite work. you see who the people who are actually armed and fighting up in the north, you know, they are of concern to the u.s.. when you look at the consequences for russia, i mean, this is not just a regional question. it is about the relationship with another superpower with the u.n.. really, you know, it's interesting. i'm sure that a good percentage of the people here, when bush acted to go to war in iraq, were very uncomfortable acting, and, yesterday, we find people now

saying maybe obama should do it for a different reason so i think it's a really big problem for the administration. it's not due to the electionment eng the election is not going to solve that problem for them. it's not a political -- >> actually -- >> a cautious approach -- >> exactly. >> i agree 100%, don't get me wrong. i don't think we could win; right? us invading is going to change perceptions, i agree, but either way, there's going to be these perceptions along with the perceptions of the positive images of the west. us helping syria is by no means going to change the perceptions that we helped some countries because of resources versus others. i agree with that 1 # 00%. >> i think there is a growing trends inside of washington in favor of some intervention in syria, an increased action. i see no such trend in a country, in public opinion, or i just don't see any real support for it. i think tripoli's got it right. the bottom line is what's

happening in syria is horrible, but i think in the american military intervention there makes things worse for syria and for us. you asked what is it going to look like in a year, push it out to five years. you look at an extended civil war fueled by the proxy interventions, every player in the region, right now, what you got is what started as a peaceful uprising has now. transformed into an insurgeon sigh, -- insurgency, and the turks, the iranis fund ago fuel their own proxy gangs, their fighting, and, you know, there's just no easy answer here. >> assad is alive a year from now? >> i don't think it matter whether he's in power or not. i don't see the civil war ending. imagine we succeed -- i think the administration was doing the right thing over the spring and

into the summer trying to use the united nations to broker a political transition. this was the only possible way to get to deal with the day after problem. what did syria look like after assad goes? the only way was to come up with a political transition agreement that included -- which included representatives of the current regime and of the opposition and got rid of assad and established a time line and a transition, 6-point plan to move towards negotiated transition. that failed. it was the right thing to do. it failed. now we're in a situation where there's almost no -- i mean, there's a u.p. representative out there trying, but right now, there's no prospect for a political horizon, and that means that we've seen this rapid diplomacy sent into armed insurgency and war, and that's why i'm extremely pessimistic -- >> so the answer is -- >> i don't think containment --

>> make sure it stays in syria and does not -- >> i just don't see a limited way the u.s. tips the balance. it sculles the bloodshed, no fly zone, doesn't solve the problem, and nobodiments u.s. troops on the -- nobody wants u.s. troops on the ground so there you go. >> on that cheery note, let's go to questions. >> there's the beginnings of discussion of finding safe passage for assad out of the country. who might be willing to take him, a, and i can think of a place like -- what would the russians and the chinese say or do? would they be willing to collaborate on that as a possibility? what, if it did, become a possibility, would that achieve in terms of listening to what you just said, mark, in making

any kind of change in what happens to the country afterwards if we're going to continue to have this on going problem with different factions. >> assad would have to go someplace that's not with the international criminal court. he could come to washington. [laughter] more than likely, he would have to go to moscow or someplace like that. it would make a huge difference if he left allowing the political transition, but to be perfectly honest, the possibility of reconciling various factions inside of syria is infin nitly lower today than six months ago when they worked with the russians on such a plan so i think it's the right thing to try. personally, i'd like to see b bashar indicted because i think

it is absolutely unacceptable to be impunity for the atrocities carryied out there, but at the same time, diplomacy is needed to bring about an end game. >> back in the back. ..

>> and the consequences of foreign policy. is true that the reporters for several days of the major satellites egyptian tv word doing shows continuously with the election returns. six hours. i spent my evenings they're learning. [laughter]

who was in the election and right in the middle. there is interest. model lot of people know about it. at the same time we were meeting more interactions and exchanges and also made it more difficult because of the security issues. >> al jazeera at ast about the elections based along racial lines because of the subgroups disproportionately went to one candidate or the other. i said but give us credit. one minority candidate with another minority candidate and it was about the

economy. not race or religion. that is said difficult concept for others to fully understand. >> i am kerry is. i lived in syria. when there is a lot of things breaking down into sectarianism. there is no mention syria has a largest christian population. >> lebanon. >> my figures are dated. could you comment on the role of the christian community and how you see that play out? >> that is not the

overarching problem. getting back to a comment from earlier, my half brother who was against been off the are now in turkey trying to help them get assad out to. that would go along way to get those resources spilling over to do with people from their own home country. >> most people are terrified. bottom line. in iraq the christian community was largely wiped out. and other religious minority communities. it equates frankly they are

scared. and then the assumption in this new look at this one person regime there was a significant portion of the population in. has shifted from of peaceful protest many of them have buy-back to the regime. you cannot assume that is that the whale looks on the ground. >> obviously it this generate did the year but in

the history of the secular arab nationals from the very inception, the forces that rallied behind it not only the sunni muslims but the counterweight to to the rising islamic trend. that coalition is still there. survey how each community is divided bent there are consequences because of the unknown. >> look at the united states. with the perceptions of winners and losers we have been to begin losers in iraq and three other countries. what about you ready

constitution and/or open up the quote -- political process that has to be a role for women within certain societies. >> research baidu compared to the feminist movement in the united states is the women in the middle east do not appreciate the western influence gender equal tells them and how they should columbia part of the government. i am not a big proponent to have that move forward. >> for want of a better term

of tahrir square there are vigilante groups protecting women. >> in tunisia for example,, they did not even allow public institutions and schools and has been reversed. look at the election laws, they forced average other party candidate to be a woman. as a consequence that you have more women. and that this within the islamic groups so they have a larger representation. we will see how that works out. but there is the idea is not up to us.

and saudi arabia people's focus on this initiative five. sure there is but they're only about 10% of the population. but more than half of the college students the women are all connected with all kinds of issues, we will see it. it will have been very country to country. >> with libya you don't have to worry about it near as much.

the one thing he promoted is gender equality per crow and the ministries of house house, that was never as big a problem as it has been in the middle east. >> we are coming up on time. ask your questions. >> i am from st. john's college. i am interested if after the air of spring the middle east is more united than it was before? should the united states and the world regard it as being more united alert are there more differences? also specifically a taka

reunification and what the differences are. >> is the been have the referenced earlier today been making a couple major points which was then need for the growth of pluralism and the seeds of growth and reiterated the point* american and should not have much to do. but i would ask the panel where there see the growth of conditions to help nurture it? >> to talk about other

regional and nationalism is a phenomenon but should we talk about the motive one country can see what is happening and respond real-time? >> moving through social m&a twitter there is a a greater degree of identification through the arab world more than ever in history. january through march was probably the highest level of interaction in an era of history. watch out jazeera event in february they would show

images of five different era of cities with protesters marching at the same time chanting the same slogan. simultaneously. that was really a unprecedented. but that momentum has broken down. countries go their different ways, the egyptians 102 nationsbank kuwaitis are consumed with their of politics. it is a common story but not as intense are manifestimanifesti ng the same way. bad name list spread as well as good things. i saw a survey showing there is higher numbers of

egyptians that say she and not -- should not be considered real muslims. most egyptians probably have never seen a shia and their live. in this spread through the media channels. >> with unification and to focus on local issues how to identify those those is still interesting. only one-third identified as the first choice of identity. win new breakdown in essence when you even ask with the

interest of arabs and muslims there is a sense of connectedness but politically a it is fascinating we have not focused on the state's. egypt is due going through a revolution in it cannot be as assertive as it would like an iraq is not fully integrated yet. some of that leaves the goal cooperation council also now you see the political dominance that invited to other states and two the

area in a change for economic security corporation that is the coalition right now of the arab world. there is no one else that is what we have. >> the chip will come back. >> with identity politics you have the tribal aspects. >> there are two things going on with the identity there is also divisions that are continuing. i was in egypt last august for ramadan is the most lake days of opera there is a fever people cannot wait to

see the places liberated. to deal with the issues that are facing them that goes on at the same time not to overgeneralizes that sectarianism. >> our professors here have given us arab awakening thank you very much. [applause]

>> i want my fiction to be intensely jealous deck. of less look at what is going on the real mess the things influencing yourself and everybody else.

>> they give quote being here we had some pretty lively discussions so far. we're on different sides of the aisle but come together for different issues. the current commercial -- commissioner the former of a member and state representative and the texas state senator help state wide office of the last five years and i am

sure we will get to the rest [laughter] in launched a website recently the problems are 10 farmers and ranchers are having check that out and look at some certain testimonials. is this a for not is something we will discuss. one of eight children born to migrant farm met -- farmworkers. got a master's in international trade from the home town laredo and elected to congress in 2005. they both come from different sides of the iowa. so commissioner, to start start, what prompted you to get interested with a

security? >> good to be with you. i got involved with this issue because farmers and ranchers are being shot at from criminal organizations and they are asking for help. washington is a denial of the threat that is happening in texas. our federal agents, border control, edie day, texas department of public safety, rangers, please officers are doing whatever they can to protect sovereignty and landowners. but washington is in denial that is why i am involved. >> you we have seen new if

the radio more money is coming in to be an either side we can all agree on that so is it as bad as the commissioner states? fam i thank you very much i am grateful for allowing us to be here. also todd and i were appropriations that the state house. we expected day debates. [laughter] i think the american public is frustrated with people pointing fingers -- fingers. title and i can come up with some ideas by the end of the conversation. one cannot say washington is in denial win new think the

border patrol and the ice individuals and and as you know, we now see more deportation then it any other time in history double the amount of border patrol. 21,500. 18,500 are on the southwest border. 8,000 are here on the texas border. money comes from washington. $2.3 billion to the state not the border patrol, ice, none of those but just to the state of texas.

$2.3 billion. can redo better? yes but we have to work together and one to work with todd staples. the border is interesting and live on the border. my wife and kids live there. i invite people to come to the border for a realistic approach. there are two extremes when to general say it is a war zone. then look at the fbi statistics, compared to the national statistics the border is safer. city by city per 100,000 you can see it has less murders and assaults by no one day

definitional debate but we can talk about what the spillover is. >> you yourself have been a sponsor for additional resources. i am grateful. but to bring of the general reports comment to say it is improper that washington and is in denial to attack senior military professionals like you did they were merely eight -- rally giving their response i think you are dead wrong. here is why washington is in denial. we have a president of

united states coast university of texas in el paso and makes jokes about the border. we have 140 dead bodies discovered in the last year in two rural counties. the statistics are great but no amount can cover the blood is shed from the drug cartel members. know about could be manipulated. >> use if those are black and white but they're not accurate why are they not? >> you see are dated covers eight major crime categories. they do not covered drug trafficking are money-laundering. human trafficking

trafficking, kidnapping or extortion and not included. if we have 1241 miles. there are great communities. 93% of the texas mexico border is unincorporated allot of cross-border running civic the videos are on your district how you respond? >> i will not dispute anybody in the video any personal experience our feelings i will not dispute them at all. at all. right after that conversation wave brought in different ranchers, todd staples could not make it but we asked ranchers what

else can we do? we came up with a series of solutions i am more interested to find solutions how we do this. with the two retired generals of respect the military but as any individuals were you paid $85,000 to come up with a report when you did not come down? they did not like that question. i asked a very simple question. if you can handle the truth did you? if people get insulted to make it is sold the border

to say it is the war zone but you cannot even ask questions? i realist about the border i think i have a general idea what is happening across the river. we have to start the approach. mexico is not the enemy. we have to work together with law-enforcement rehab to start off what -- working together. look at the national crime organization. 250 cities austin, washington, loredo, the drug cartels are here already. we know this. i a real list. instead of deba